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Abstract
We consider a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic differential game. The time-
inconsistency arises from the presence of quadratic terms of the expected state as well as state-dependent
term in the objective functionals. We define an equilibrium strategy, which is different from the classi-
cal one, and derived a sufficient conditions for equilibrium strategies via a system of forward-backward
stochastic differential equations. When the state is one-dimensional and the coefficients are all determin-
istic, we find an explicit equilibrium strategy. The uniqueness of such equilibrium strategy is given.
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1 Introduction
Time inconsistency in dynamic decision making is often observe in social systems and daily life. Motivated
by practical applications, especially in mathematical economics and finance, time-inconsistency control
problems have recently attracted considerable research interest and efforts attempting to seek equilibrium,
instead of optimal, controls. At a conceptual level, the idea is that a decision made by the controller at
every instant of time is considered as a game against all the decisions made by the future incarnations of the
controller. An “equilibrium” control is therefore one such that any deviation from it at any time instant will
be worse off. The study on time inconsistency by economists can be dated back to Stroz [23] and Phelps
([21, 22]) in models with discrete time (see [17] and [18] for further developments), and adapted by Karp
([15, 16]), and by Ekeland and Lazrak ([5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]) to the case of continuous time. In the LQ control
problems, Yong [24] studied a time-inconsistent deterministic model and derived equilibrium controls via
some integral equations.
It is natural to study time inconsistency in the stochastic models. Ekeland and Pirvu [11] studied the
non-exponential discounting which leads to time inconsistency in an agent’s investment-consumption poli-
cies in a Merton model. Grenadier and Wang [12] also studied the hyperbolic discounting problem in an
optimal stopping model. In a Markovian systems, Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [3] proposed a definition of a general
∗Partially supported by NSFC (No.11501330) and CPSF (Grant No. 2015M582071). E-mail: zhouqinglong@sdu.edu.cn
†Partially supported by NSFC (No. 11501325). E-mail: gf zong@126.com
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stochastic control problem with time inconsistent terms, and proposed some sufficient condition for a control
to be solution by a system of integro-differential equations. They constructed some solutions for some ex-
amples including an LQ one, but it looks very hard to find not-to-harsh condition on parameters to ensure the
existence of a solution. Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou [4] also constructed an equilibrium for a mean-variance
portfolio selection with state-dependent risk aversion. Basak and Chabakauri [1] studied the mean-variance
portfolio selection problem and got more details on the constructed solution. Hu, Jin and Zhou [13, 14] stud-
ied the general LQ control problem with time inconsistent terms in a non-Markovian system and constructed
an unique equilibrium for quite general LQ control problem, including a non-Markovian system.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the time-inconsistent problems are associated with the control
problems though we use the game formulation to define its equilibrium. In the problems of game theory,
the literatures about time inconsistency is little [2, 19]. However, the definitions of equilibrium strategies
in the above two papers are based on some corresponding control problems like before. In this paper, we
formulate a general stochastic LQ differential game, where the objective functional of each player include
both a quadratic term of the expected state and a state-dependent term. These non-standard terms each
introduces time inconsistency into the problem in somewhat different ways. We define our equilibrium via
open-loop controls. Then we derive a general sufficient condition for equilibrium strategies through a system
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). An intriguing feature of these FBSDEs is
that a time parameter is involved; so these form a flow of FBSDEs. When the state process is scalar valued
and all the coefficients are deterministic functions of time, we are able to reduce this flow of FBSDEs into
several Riccati-like ODEs. Comparing to the ODEs in [13], though the state process is scalar valued, the
unknowns are matrix-valued because of two players. Therefore, such ODEs are harder to solve than those
of [13]. Under some more stronger conditions, we obtain explicitly an equilibrium strategy, which turns out
to be a linear feedback. We also prove that the equilibrium strategy we obtained is unique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to the formulation of our
problem and the definition of equilibrium strategy. In Section 3, we apply the spike variation technique to
derive a flow of FBSEDs and a sufficient condition of equilibrium strategies. Based on this general results,
we solve in Section 4 the case when the state is one dimensional and all the coefficients are deterministic.
The uniqueness of such equilibrium strategy is also proved in this section.
2 Problem setting
Let T > 0 be the end of a finite time horizon, and let (Wt)0≤t≤T = (W1t , ...,Wdt )0≤t≤T be a d-dimensional
Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). Denote by (Ft) the augmented filtration generated by
(Wt).
As in [13], let Sn be the set of symmetric n×n real matrices; L2
F
(Ω,Rl) be the set of square-integrable ran-
dom variables; L2
F
(t, T ;Rn) be the set of {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted square-integrable processes; and L2F (Ω; C(t, T ;Rn))
be the set of continuous {Fs}s∈[t,T ]-adapted square-integrable processes.
We consider a continuous-time, n-dimensional nonhomogeneous linear controlled system (cf. [13])
dXs = [AsXs + B′1,su1,s + B′2,su2,s + bs]ds +
d∑
j=1
[C jsXs + D j1,su1,s + D
j
2,su2,s + σ
j
s]dW js , X0 = x0. (2.1)
Here A is a bounded deterministic function on [0, T ] with value in Rn×n. The other parameters B1, B2,C, D1, D2
are all essentially bounded adapted processes on [0, T ] with values in Rl×n,Rl×n,Rn×n,Rn×l,Rn×l, respec-
tively; b and σ j are stochastic processes in L2
F
(0, T ;Rn). The processes ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl), i = 1, 2 are the
controls, and X is the state process valued in Rn. Finally, x0 ∈ Rn is the initial state. It is obvious that for
any controls ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl), i = 1, 2, there exists a unique solution X ∈ L2F (Ω,C(0, T ;Rn)).
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As time evolves, we need to consider the controlled system starting from time t ∈ [0, T ] and state
xt ∈ L2Ft (Ω;Rn):
dXs = [AsXs + B′1,su1,s + B′2,su2,s + bs]ds +
d∑
j=1
[C jsXs + D j1,su1,s + D
j
2,su2,s + σ
j
s]dW js , Xt = xt. (2.2)
For any controls ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl), i = 1, 2, there exists a unique solution Xt,xt ,u1,u2 ∈ L2F (Ω,C(0, T ;Rn)).
We consider a two-person differential game problem. At any time t with the system state Xt = xt, the
i-th (i = 1, 2) person’s aim is to minimize her cost (if maximize, we can times the following function by −1):
Ji(t, xt; u1, u2) = 12Et
∫ T
t
[〈Qi,sXs, Xs〉 + 〈Ri,sui,s, ui,s〉]ds + 12Et[〈GiXT , XT 〉]
−
1
2
〈hiEt[XT ],Et[XT ]〉 − 〈λixt + µi,Et[XT ]〉 (2.3)
over u1, u2 ∈ L2F (t, T ;Rl), where X = Xt,xt ,u1,u2 , and Et[·] = E[·|Ft]. Here, for i = 1, 2, Qi and Ri are both
given essentially bounded adapted process on [0, T ] with values in Sn and Sl, respectively, Gi, hi, λi, µi are all
constants in Sn, Sn, Rn×n and Rn, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that Qi,Ri are non-negative definite
almost surely and Gi are non-negative definite.
Given a control pair (u∗1, u∗2). For any t ∈ [0, T ), ǫ > 0, and v1, v2 ∈ L2Ft (Ω,Rl), define
u
t,ǫ,vi
i,s = u
∗
i,s + vi1s∈[t,t+ǫ), s ∈ [t, T ], i = 1, 2. (2.4)
Definition 2.1 Let (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl) × L2F (0, T ;Rl) be a given strategy pair, and let X∗ be the state
process corresponding to (u∗1, u∗2). The strategy pair (u∗1, u∗2) is called an equilibrium if
lim
ǫ↓0
J1(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , u∗2) − J1(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
ǫ
≥ 0, (2.5)
lim
ǫ↓0
J2(t, X∗t ; u∗1, ut,ǫ,v22 ) − J2(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
ǫ
≥ 0, (2.6)
where ut,ǫ,vii , i = 1, 2 are defined by (2.4), for any t ∈ [0, T ) and v1, v2 ∈ L2Ft (Ω,Rl).
Remark. The “≥” in (2.5)-(2.6) because of each person want to minimize his/her cost as we claimed
before. The above definition means that, in each time t, the equilibrium is a static Nash equilibrium in a
corresponding game.
3 Sufficient conditions
Let (u∗1, u∗2) be a fixed strategy pair, and let X∗ be the corresponding state process. For any t ∈ [0, T ),
define in the time interval [t, T ] the processes (pi(·; t), (k ji (·; t) j=1,2,...,d)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;Rn) × (L2F (t, T ;Rn))d and
(Pi(·; t), (K ji (·; t) j=1,2,...,d)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;Sn) × (L2F (t, T ;Sn))d for i = 1, 2 are the solutions to the following
equations:
 dpi(s; t) = −[A
′
s pi(s; t) +
∑d
j=1(C js)′k ji (s; t) + Qi,sX∗s ]ds +
∑d
j=1 k
j
i (s; t)dW js , s ∈ [t, T ],
pi(T ; t) = GiX∗T − hiEt[X∗T ] − λiX∗t − µi,
(3.7)

dPi(s; t) = −
{
A′sPi(s; t) + Pi(s; t)As + Qi,s +
∑d
j=1[(C js)′Pi(s; t)C js + (C js)′K ji (s; t) + K ji (s; t)C js]
}
ds
+
∑d
j=1 K
j
i (s; t)dW ji , s ∈ [t, T ],
Pi(T ; t) = Gi,
(3.8)
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for i = 1, 2. From the assumption that Qi and Gi are non-negative definite, it follows that Pi(s; t) are non-
negative definite for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.1 For any t ∈ [0, T ), ǫ > 0, and v1, v2 ∈ L2Ft (Ω,R
l), define ut,ǫ,vii , i = 1, 2 by (2.4). Then
J1(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , u∗2) − J1(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2) = Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
{
〈Λ1(s; t), v1〉 + 12〈H1(s; t)v1, v1〉
}
ds + o(ǫ), (3.9)
J2(t, X∗t ; u∗1, ut,ǫ,v22 ) − J2(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2) = Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
{
〈Λ2(s; t), v2〉 + 12〈H2(s; t)v2, v2〉
}
ds + o(ǫ), (3.10)
where Λi(s; t) = Bi,s pi(s; t) + ∑dj=1(D ji,s)′k ji (s; t) + Ri,su∗i,s and Hi(s; t) = Ri,s + ∑dj=1(D ji,s)′Pi(s; t)D ji,s for
i = 1, 2.
Proof. Let Xt,ǫ,v1,v2 be the state process corresponding to ut,ǫ,vii , i = 1, 2. Then by standard perturbation
approach (cf. [20, 13] or pp. 126-128 of [25]), we have
Xt,ǫ,v1,v2s = X
∗
s + Y
t,ǫ,v1,v2
s + Z
t,ǫ,v1,v2
s , s ∈ [t, T ], (3.11)
where Y ≡ Y t,ǫ,v1,v2 and Z ≡ Zt,ǫ,v1,v2 satisfy
 dYs = AsYsds +
∑d
j=1[C jsYs + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)]dW
j
s , s ∈ [t, T ],
Yt = 0,
(3.12)
 dZs = [AsZs + B
′
1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + B
′
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)]ds +
∑d
j=1 C
j
sZsdW js , s ∈ [t, T ],
Zt = 0.
(3.13)
Moreover, by Theorem 4.4 in [25], we have
Et
[
sup
s∈[t,T )
|Ys|2
]
= O(ǫ), Et
[
sup
s∈[t,T )
|Zs|2
]
= O(ǫ2). (3.14)
With A being deterministic, it follows from the dynamics of Y that, for any s ∈ [t, T ], we have
Et[Ys] =
∫ s
t
Et[AsYτ]dτ =
∫ s
t
AsEt[Yτ]dτ. (3.15)
Hence we conclude that
Et[Ys] = 0 s ∈ [t, T ]. (3.16)
By these estimates, we can calculate
Ji(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , ut,ǫ,v22 ) − Ji(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
=
1
2
Et
∫ T
t
[〈Qi,s(2X∗s + Ys + Zs), Ys + Zs〉 + 〈Ri,s(2u∗i + vi), vi〉1s∈[t,t+ǫ)]ds
+Et[〈GiX∗T , YT + ZT 〉] +
1
2
Et[〈Gi(YT + ZT ), YT + ZT 〉]
−〈hiEt[X∗T ] + λiX∗t + µi,Et[YT + ZT ]〉 −
1
2
〈hiEt[YT + ZT ],Et[YT + ZT ]〉
=
1
2
Et
∫ T
t
[〈Qi,s(2X∗s + Ys + Zs), Ys + Zs〉 + 〈Ri,s(2u∗i + vi), vi〉1s∈[t,t+ǫ)]ds
+Et[〈GiX∗T − hiEt[X∗T ] − λiX∗t − µi, YT + ZT 〉 +
1
2
〈Gi(YT + ZT ), YT + ZT 〉] + o(ǫ). (3.17)
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Recalling that (pi(·; t), ki(·; t)) and (Pi(·; t), Ki(·; t)) solve, respectively, (3.7) and (3.8) for i = 1, 2, we have
Et[〈GiX∗T − hiEt[X∗T ] − λiX∗t − µi, YT + ZT 〉]
= Et[〈pi(T ; t), YT + ZT 〉]
= Et
[ ∫ T
t
d〈pi(s; t), Ys + Zs〉
]
= Et
∫ T
t
[
〈pi(s; t), As(Ys + Zs) + B′1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + B′2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)〉
−〈A′s pi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(C js)′k ji (s; t) + Qi,sX∗s , Ys + Zs〉
+
d∑
j=1
〈k ji (s; t),C js(Ys + Zs) + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)〉
]
ds
= Et
∫ T
t
[
〈−Qi,sX∗s 〉 +
〈
B1,s pi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j1,s)′k
j
i (s; t), v11s∈[t,t+ǫ)
〉
+
〈
B2,spi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j2,s)′k
j
i (s; t), v21s∈[t,t+ǫ)
〉]
ds (3.18)
and
Et[
1
2
〈Gi(YT + ZT ), YT + ZT 〉]
= Et[
1
2
〈Pi(T ; t)(YT + ZT ), YT + ZT 〉]
= Et
[ ∫ T
t
d〈Pi(s; t)(Ys + Zs), Ys + Zs〉
]
= Et
∫ T
t
{
〈Pi(s; t)(Ys + Zs), As(Ys + Zs) + B′1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + B′2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)〉
+〈Pi(s; t)[As(Ys + Zs) + B′1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + B′2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)], Ys + Zs〉
−〈[A′sPi(s; t) + Pi(s; t)As + Qi,s +
d∑
j=1
((C js)′Pi(s; t)C js + (C js)′K ji (s; t) + K ji (s; t)C js)](Ys + Zs), Ys + Zs〉
+
d∑
j=1
〈K ji (s; t)(Ys + Zs),C js(Ys + Zs) + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)〉
+
d∑
j=1
〈K ji (s; t)[C js(Ys + Zs) + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)], Ys + Zs〉
+
d∑
j=1
〈Pi(s; t)[C js(Ys + Zs) + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)],
C js(Ys + Zs) + D j1,sv11s∈[t,t+ǫ) + D
j
2,sv21s∈[t,t+ǫ)〉
}
ds
= Et
∫ T
t
[
− 〈Qi,s(Ys + Zs), Ys + Zs〉
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+d∑
j=1
〈Pi(s; t)[D j1,sv1 + D
j
2,sv2], D
j
1,sv1 + D
j
2,sv2〉1s∈[t,t+ǫ)
]
ds + o(ǫ) (3.19)
Combining (3.17)-(3.19), we have
Ji(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , ut,ǫ,v22 ) − Ji(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
= Et
∫ T
t
[1
2
〈Ri,s(2u∗i + vi), vi〉1s∈[t,t+ǫ) +
〈
B1,s pi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j1,s)′k
j
i (s; t), v11s∈[t,t+ǫ)
〉
+
〈
B2,s pi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j2,s)′k
j
i (s; t), v21s∈[t,t+ǫ)
〉
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
〈Pi(s; t)[D j1,sv1 + D
j
2,sv2], D
j
1,sv1 + D
j
2,sv2〉1s∈[t,t+ǫ)
]
ds + o(ǫ). (3.20)
Take i = 1, we let v2 = 0, then ut,ǫ,v22 = u
∗
2, from (3.20), we obtain
J1(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , u∗2) − J1(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
= Et
∫ T
t
{〈
R1,su∗1 + B1,s p1(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j1,s)′k
j
1(s; t), v11s∈[t,t+ǫ)
〉
+
1
2
〈[
R1,s +
d∑
j=1
(D j1,s)′P1(s; t)D
j
1,s
]
v1, v1
〉}
ds
= Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
{
〈Λ1(s; t), v1〉 + 12〈H1(s; t)v1, v1〉
}
ds + o(ǫ). (3.21)
This prove (3.9), and similarly, we obtain (3.10).
Because of Ri,s and Pi(s; t), i = 1, 2 are non-negative definite, Hi(s; t), i = 1, 2 are also non-negative
definite. In view of (3.9)-(3.10), a sufficient condition for an equilibrium is
Et
∫ T
t
|Λi(s; t)|ds < +∞, lim
s↓t
Et[Λi(s; t)] = 0 a.s. ∀t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2. (3.22)
Similar to Proposition 3.3 of [14], we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2 For any triple of state and control processes (X∗, u∗1, u∗2), the solution to (3.7) in L2(0, T ;Rn) ×
(L2(0, T ;Rn))d satisfies ki(s; t1) = ki(s; t2) for a.e. s ≥ max{t1, t2}, i = 1, 2. Furthermore, there exist
ρi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rl),δi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rl×n) and ξi ∈ L2(Ω; C(0, T ;Rn)), such that
Λi(s; t) = ρi(s) + δi(s)ξi(t), i = 1, 2. (3.23)
Therefore, we have another characterization for equilibrium strategies:
Theorem 3.3 Given a strategy pair (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rl) × L2(0, T ;Rl). Denote X∗ as the state process,
and (pi(·; t), (k ji (·; t) j=1,2,...,d)) ∈ L2F (t, T ;Rn)×(L2F (t, T ;Rn))d as the unique solution for the BSDE (3.7), with
ki(s) = ki(s; t) according to Lemma 3.2 for i = 1, 2 respectively. For i = 1, 2, letting
Λi(s, t) = Bi,s pi(s; t) +
d∑
j=1
(D j,s)′k(s; t) j + Ri,su∗i,s, s ∈ [t, T ], (3.24)
then u∗ is an equilibrium strategy if and only if
Λi(t, t) = 0, a.s., a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2. (3.25)
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Proof. The proof is by Lemma 3.4 of [14] and Theorem 3.4.
The following is the main general result for the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ differential game.
Theorem 3.4 A strategy pair (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl) × L2F (0, T ;Rl) is an equilibrium strategy pair if thefollowing two conditions hold for any time t:
(i) The system of SDEs

dX∗s = [AsX∗s + B′1,su∗1,s + B′2,su∗2,s + bs]ds +
∑d
j=1[C
j
sX∗s + D
j
1,su
∗
1,s + D
j
2,su
∗
2,s + σ
j
s]dW js ,
X∗0 = x0,
dp1(s; t) = −[A′s p1(s; t) +
∑d
j=1(C js)′k j1(s; t) + Q1,sX∗s ]ds +
∑d
j=1 k
j
1(s; t)dW
j
s , s ∈ [t, T ],
p1(T ; t) = G1X∗T − h1Et[X∗T ] − λ1X∗t − µ1,
dp2(s; t) = −[A′s p2(s; t) +
∑d
j=1(C js)′k j2(s; t) + Q2,sX∗s ]ds +
∑d
j=1 k
j
2(s; t)dW
j
s , s ∈ [t, T ],
p2(T ; t) = G2X∗T − h2Et[X∗T ] − λ2X∗t − µ2,
(3.26)
admits a solution (X∗, p1, k1, p2, k2);
(ii) Λi(s; t) = Ri,su∗i,s + Bi,s pi(s; t) +
∑d
j=1(D ji,s)′k ji (s; t), i = 1, 2 satisfy condition (3.25).
Proof. Given a strategy pair (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl) × L2F (0, T ;Rl) satisfying (i) and (ii), then for any
v1, v2 ∈ L2Ft (Ω,Rl), define Λi, Hi, i = 1, 2 as in Proposition 3.1. We have
lim
ǫ↓0
J1(t, X∗t ; ut,ǫ,v11 , u∗2) − J1(t, X∗t ; u∗1, u∗2)
ǫ
= lim
ǫ↓0
Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
{
〈Λ1(s; t), v1〉 + 12〈H1(s; t)v1, v1〉
}
ds
ǫ
≥ lim
ǫ↓0
Et
∫ t+ǫ
t
〈Λ1(s; t), v1〉ds
ǫ
= 0, (3.27)
proving the first condition of Definition 2.1, and the proof of the second condition is similar.
Theorem 3.4 involve the existence of solutions to a flow of FBSDEs along with other conditions. The
system (3.26) is more complicated than system (3.6) in [13]. As declared in [13], “proving the general
existence for this type of FBSEs remains an outstanding open problem”, it is also true for our system (3.26).
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the case when n = 1. When n = 1, the state process X is a
scalar-valued rocess evolving by the dynamics
dXs = [AsXs + B′1,su1,s + B′2,su2,s + bs]ds + [CsXs + D1,su1,s + D2,su2,s + σs]′dWs, X0 = x0, (3.28)
where A is a bounded deterministic scalar function on [0, T ]. The other parameters B,C, D are all es-
sentially bounded and Ft-adapted processes on [0, T ] with values in Rl,Rd,Rd×l, respectively. Moreover,
b ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R) and σ ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rd).
In this case, the adjoint equations for the equilibrium strategy become
{
dpi(s; t) = −[A′s pi(s; t) + (Cs)′ki(s; t) + Qi,sX∗s ]ds + ki(s; t)′dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
pi(T ; t) = GiX∗T − hiEt[X∗T ] − λiX∗t − µi,
(3.29)
{
dPi(s; t) = −[(2As + |Cs|2)Pi(s; t) + 2C′sK(s; t) + Qi,s]ds + Ki(s; t)′dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
Pi(T ; t) = Gi, (3.30)
for i = 1, 2. For convenience, we also state here the n = 1 version of Theorem 3.4:
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Theorem 3.5 A strategy pair (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl) × L2F (0, T ;Rl) is an equilibrium strategy pair if, for
any time t ∈ [0, T ),
(i) The system of SDEs
dX∗s = [AsX∗s + B′1,su∗1,s + B′2,su∗2,s + bs]ds + [CsX∗s + D1,su∗1,s + D2,su∗2,s + σs]′dWs,
X∗0 = x0,
dp1(s; t) = −[As p1(s; t) + (Cs)′k1(s; t) + Q1,sX∗s ]ds + k1(s; t)′dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
p1(T ; t) = G1X∗T − h1Et[X∗T ] − λ1X∗t − µ1,
dp2(s; t) = −[As p2(s; t) + (Cs)′k2(s; t) + Q2,sX∗s ]ds + k2(s; t)′dWs, s ∈ [t, T ],
p2(T ; t) = G2X∗T − h2Et[X∗T ] − λ2X∗t − µ2,
(3.31)
admits a solution (X∗, p1, k1, p2, k2);
(ii) Λi(s; t) = Ri,su∗i,s + Bi,s pi(s; t) + (Di,s)′ki(s; t), i = 1, 2 satisfy condition (3.25).
4 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategy when coefficients are
deterministic
The unique solvability of (3.31) remains a challenging open problem even for the case n = 1. However,
we are able to solve this problem when the parameters A, B1, B2,C, D1, D2, b, σ, Q1, Q2,R1 and R2 are all
deterministic functions.
Throughout this section we assume all the parameters are deterministic functions of t. In this case, since
G1,G2 has been also assumed to be deterministic, the BSDEs (3.30) turns out to be ODEs with solutions
Ki ≡ 0 and Pi(s; t) = Gie
∫ T
s
(2Au+|Cu |2)du +
∫ T
s
e
∫ T
s
(2Au+|Cu |2)duQi,vdv for i = 1, 2.
4.1 An intuitional idea and the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy
As in classical LQ control, we attempt to look for a linear feedback equilibrium strategy pair. For such
purpose, motivated by [13], given any t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the following process:
pi(s; t) = Mi,sX∗s − Ni,sEt[X∗s ] − Γi,sX∗t + Φi,s, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, i = 1, 2, (4.32)
where Mi, Ni, Γi,Φi are deterministic differentiable functions with ˙Mi = mi, ˙Ni = ni, ˙Γi = γi and ˙Φi = φi
for i = 1, 2. The advantage of this process is to separate the variables X∗s ,Et[X∗s ] and X∗t in the solutions
pi(s; t), i = 1, 2, thereby reducing the complicated FBSDEs to some ODEs.
For any fixed t, applying Ito’s formula to (4.32) in the time variable s, we obtain, for i = 1, 2,
dpi(s; t) = {Mi,s(AsX∗s + B′1,su∗1,s + B′2,su∗2,s + bs) + mi,sX∗s − Ni,sEt[AsX∗s + B′1,su∗1,s + B′2,su∗2,s + bs]
−ni,sEt[X∗s ] − γi,sX∗t + φi,s}ds + Mi,s(CsX∗s + D1,su∗1,s + D2,su∗2,s + σs)′dWs. (4.33)
Comparing the dWs term of dpi(s; t) in (3.31) and (4.33), we have
ki(s; t) = Mi,s[CsX∗s + D1,su∗1,s + D2,su∗2,s + σs], s ∈ [t, T ], i = 1, 2. (4.34)
Notice that k(s; t) turns out to be independent of t.
Putting the above expressions (4.32) and (4.34) of pi(s; t) and ki(s; t), i = 1, 2 into (3.25), we have
Ri,su∗i,s + Bi,s[(Mi,s −Ni,s −Γi,s)X∗s +Φi,s]+D′i,sMi,s[CsX∗s +D1,su∗1,s +D2,su∗2,s +σs] = 0, s ∈ [0, T ], (4.35)
for i = 1, 2. Then we can formally deduce
u∗i,s = αi,sX
∗
s + βi,s, i = 1, 2. (4.36)
8
Let Ms = diag(M1,sIl, M2,sIl), Ns = diag(N1,sIl, N2,sIl), Γs = diag(Γ1,sIl, Γ2,sIl),Φs = diag(Φ1,sIl,Φ2,sIl),
Rs = diag(R1,s,R2,s), Bs =
( B1,s
B2,s
)
, Ds = ( D1,s, D2,s ), u∗s =
(
u∗1,s
u∗2,s
)
, αs =
(
α1,s
α2,s
)
and βs =
(
β1,s
β2,s
)
. Then from
(4.35), we have
Rsu∗s + [(Ms − Ns − Γs)X∗s + Φs]Bs + MsD′s[CsX∗s + Ds(αsX∗s + βs) + σs] = 0, s ∈ [0, T ] (4.37)
and hence
αs = −(Rs + MsD′sDs)−1[(Ms − Ns − Γs)Bs + MsD′sCs], (4.38)
βs = −(Rs + MsD′sDs)−1(ΦsBs + MsD′sσs). (4.39)
Next, comparing the ds term of dpi(s; t) in (3.31) and (4.33) (we supress the argument s here), we have
Mi[AX∗ + B′(αX∗ + β) + b] + miX∗ − Ni{AEt[X∗] + B′Et[αX∗ + β] + b} − niEt[X∗] − γiX∗t + φi
= −[A(MiX∗ − NiEt[X∗] − ΓiX∗t + Φi) + MiC′(CX∗ + D(αX∗ + β) + σ)]. (4.40)
Notice in the above that X∗ = X∗s and Et[X∗] = Et[X∗s ] due to the omission of s. This leads to the following
equations for Mi, Ni, Γi,Φi:{
˙Mi = −(2A + |C|2)Mi − Qi + Mi(B′ +C′D)(R + MD′D)−1[(M − N − Γ)B + MD′C], s ∈ [0, T ],
Mi,T = Gi;
(4.41)
{
˙Ni = −2ANi + NiB′(R + MD′D)−1[(M − N − Γ)B + MD′C], s ∈ [0, T ],
Ni,T = hi;
(4.42)
{
˙Γi = −AΓi, s ∈ [0, T ],
Γi,T = λi;
(4.43)

˙Φi = −{A − [B′(M − N) +C′DM](R + MD′D)−1B}Φi − (Mi − Ni)b − MiC′σ
−[(Mi − Ni)B′ + MiC′D](R + MD′D)−1MD′σ, s ∈ [0, T ],
Φi,T = −µi.
(4.44)
Though Mi, Ni, Γi,Φi, i = 1, 2 are scalars, M, N, Γ,Φ are now matrices because of two players. Therefore,
the above equations are more complicated than the similar equations (4.5)-(4.8) in [13]. Before we solve
the equations (4.41)-(4.44), we first prove that, if exist, the equilibrium constructed above is the unique
equilibrium. Indeed, we have
Theorem 4.1 Let
L1 =
{
X(·; ·) : X(·; t) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;R), sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
sup
s≥t
|X(s; t)|2
]
< +∞
 (4.45)
and
L2 =
{
Y(·; ·) : Y(·; t) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rd), sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[∫ T
t
|X(s; t)|2ds
]
< +∞
 . (4.46)
Suppose all the parameters A, B1, B2,C, D1, D2, b, σ, Q1, Q2,R1 and R2 are all deterministic.
When (Mi, Ni, Γi,Φi), i = 1, 2 exist, and for i = 1, 2, (pi(s; t), ki(s; t)) ∈ L1 × L2, the equilibrium strategy is
unique.
Proof. Suppose there is another equilibrium (X, u1, u2), then the equation system (3.7), with X∗ replaced
by X, admits a solution (pi(s; t), ki(s), ui,s) for i = 1, 2, which satisfies Bi,s pi(s; s)+D′i,ski(s)+Ri,sui,s = 0 for
a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]. For i = 1, 2, define
p¯i(s; t) , pi(s; t) − [Mi,sXs − Ni,sEt[Xs] − Γi,s + Φi,s], (4.47)
¯ki(s; t) , ki(s) − Mi,s(CsXs + D1,su1,s + D2,su2,s + σs), (4.48)
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where ki(s) = ki(s; t) by Lemma 3.2.
We define p(s; t) = diag(p1(s; t)Il, p2(s; t)Il), p¯(s; t) = diag(p¯1(s; t)Il, p¯2(s; t)Il), and u =
(
u1,s
u2,s
)
. By the
equilibrium condition (3.25), we have
0 =
( B1,s p1(s; s) + D′1,sk1(s) + R1,su1,s
B2,s p2(s; s) + D′2,sk2(s) + R2,su2,s
)
= p(s; s)Bs +
( D′1,sk1(s)
D′2,sk2(s)
)
+ Rsus
= [p¯(s; s) + Xs(Ms − Ns − Γs) + Φs]Bs +
(
D′1,s ¯k1(s)
D′2,s ¯k2(s)
)
+ MsD′s(CsXs + Dsus + σs) + Rsus
= p¯(s; s)Bs +
(
D′1,s ¯k1(s)
D′2,s ¯k2(s)
)
+ Xs[(Ms − Ns − Γs)Bs + MsD′sCs] + ΦsBs + MsD′sσs
+(Rs + MsD′sDs)us. (4.49)
Since Rs + MsD′sDs is invertible, we have
us = −(Rs + MsD′sDs)−1
{
p¯(s; s)Bs +
(
D′1,s ¯k1(s)
D′2,s ¯k2(s)
)
+ Xs[(Ms − Ns − Γs)Bs + MsD′sCs] + ΦsBs + MsD′sσs
}
,
(4.50)
and hence for i = 1, 2,
dp¯i(s; t) = dpi(s; t) − d[Mi,sXs − Ni,sEt[Xs] − Γi,s + Φi,s]
= −[As pi(s; t) +C′ski(s) + Qi,sXs]ds + k′i (s)dWs − d[Mi,sXs − Ni,sEt[Xs] − Γi,sXt + Φi,s]
= −
{
As p¯i(s; t) +C′s ¯ki(s) + As(Mi,sXs − Ni,sEt[Xs] − Γi,sXt + Φi,s)
+C′sMi,s(CsXs + D1,su1,s + D2,su2,s + σs)
}
ds
+[¯ki(s) − Mi,s(CsXs + D1,su1,s + D2,su2,s + σs)]′dWs
−
{
Mi,s[AsXs + B′sus + bs] + mi,sXs − Ni,s(AsEt[Xs] + B′sEt[us] + bs)
−ni,sEt[Xs] − γi,sXt + φi,s
}
ds
−Mi,s[CsXs + Dsus + σs]′dWs
= −
{
As p¯i(s; t) +C′s ¯ki(s) − Mi,s(B′s +C′sDs)(Rs + MsD′sDs)−1
[
Bs p¯(s; s) +
(
D′1,s ¯k1(s)
D′2,s ¯k2(s)
)]
Ni,sB′s(Rs + MsD′sDs)−1Et
[
Bs p¯(s; s) +
(
D′1,s ¯k1(s)
D′2,s ¯k2(s)
)] }
ds + ¯ki(s)′dWs, (4.51)
where we suppress the subscript s for the parameters, and we have used the equations (4.41)-(4.44) for
Mi, Ni, Γi,Φi in the last equality. From (4.47) and (4.48), we have (p¯i, ¯ki) ∈ L1 ×L2. Therefore, by Theorem
4.2 of [14], we have p¯(s; t) ≡ 0 and ¯k(s) ≡ 0.
Finally, plugging p¯ ≡ ¯k ≡ 0 into u of (4.50), we get the u being the same form of feedback strategy as in
(4.36), and hence (X, u1, u2) is the same as (X∗, u∗1, u∗2) which we got before.
4.2 Existence of the equilibrium strategies
The solutions to (4.43) is
Γi,s = λie
∫ T
s
Atdt, (4.52)
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for i = 1, 2. Let ˜N = N1/N2, from (4.42), we have ˙˜N = 0, and hence
˜N ≡
h1
h2
, N2 ≡
h2
h1
N1. (4.53)
Equations (4.41) and (4.42) form a system of coupled Riccati-type equations for (M1, M2, N1):
˙M1 = −[2A + |C|2 + B′Γ(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)]M1 − Q1
+(B + D′C)′(R + MD′D)−1M(B + D′C)M1 − B′N(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)M1,
M1,T = G1;
˙M2 = −[2A + |C|2 + B′Γ(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)]M2 − Q2
+(B + D′C)′(R + MD′D)−1M(B + D′C)M2 − B′N(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)M2,
M2,T = G2;
˙N1 = −2ANi + NiB′(R + MD′D)−1[(M − N − Γ)B + MD′C],
N1,T = h1.
(4.54)
Finally, once we get the solution for (M1, M2, N1), (4.44) is a simple ODE. Therefore, it is crucial to solve
(4.54).
Formally, we define ˜M = M1M2 and J1 =
M1
N1 and study the following equation for (M1, ˜M, J1):
˙M1 = −[2A + |C|2 + B′Γ(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)]M1 − Q1
+(B + D′C)′(R + MD′D)−1M(B + D′C)M1 − B′N(R + MD′D)−1(B + D′C)M1,
M1,T = G1;
˙
˜M = −( Q1M1 −
Q2
M1
˜M) ˜M,
˜MT = G1G2 ;
˙J1 = −[|C|2 − C′D(R + MD′D)−1M(B + D′C) + B′Γ(R + MD′D)−1D′C + Q1M1 ]J1
−C′D(R + MD′D)−1M diag(Il, h2h1 ˜MIl)B,
J1,T = G1h1 ,
(4.55)
where M = diag(M1Il, M1
˜M Il), N = diag(
M1
J1 Il,
h2
h1
M1
J1 Il) and Γ = diag(λ1e
∫ T
s
AtdtIl, λ2e
∫ T
s
AtdtIl).
By a direct calculation, we have
Proposition 4.2 If the system (4.55) admits a positive solution (M1, ˜M, J1), then the system (4.54) admits a
solution (M1, M2, N1).
In the following, we will use the truncation method to study the system (4.55). For convenienc, we use
the following notations:
a ∨ b = max{a, b}, ∀a, b ∈ R, (4.56)
a ∧ b = min{a, b}, ∀a, b ∈ R. (4.57)
Moreover, for a matrix M ∈ Rm×n and a real number c, we define
(M ∨ c)i, j = Mi, j ∨ c, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, (4.58)
(M ∧ c)i, j = Mi, j ∧ c, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (4.59)
We first consider the standard case where R − δI  0 for some δ > 0. We have
Theorem 4.3 Assume that R − δI  0 for some δ > 0 and G ≥ h > 0. Then (4.55), and hence (4.54) admit
unique solution if
(i) there exists a constant λ ≥ 0 such that B = λD′C;
(ii) |C|22l D′D − (λ + 1)D′CC′D  0.
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Proof. For fixed c > 0 and K > 0, consider the following truncated system of (4.55):

˙M1 = −[2A + |C|2 + B′Γ(R + M+c D′D)−1(B + D′C)]M1 − Q1
+(B + D′C)′(R + M+c D′D)−1(M+c ∧ K)(B + D′C)M1 − B′(N+c ∧ K)(R + M+c D′D)−1(B + D′C)M1,
M1,T = G1;
˙
˜M = −( Q1M1∨c −
Q2
M1∨c
˜M ∧ K) ˜M,
˜MT = G1G2 ;
˙J1 = −λ(1) J1 − C′D(R + M+c D′D)−1(M+c ∧ K)diag(Il, h2h1 ( ˜M ∧ K)Il)B,
J1,T = G1h1 , (4.60)
where M+c = diag((M1 ∨ 0)Il, M1∨0˜M∨c Il), N+c = diag(
M1∨0
J1∨c Il,
h2
h1
M1∨0
J1∨c Il) and
λ(1) = |C|2 − C′D(R + M+c D′D)−1(M+c ∧ K)(B + D′C) + B′Γ(R + M+c D′D)−1D′C +
Q1
M1 ∨ c
. (4.61)
Since R − δI  0, the above system (4.60) is locally Lipschitz with linear growth, and hence it admits a
unique solution (Mc,K1 , ˜Mc,K, Jc,K1 ). We will omit the superscript (c, K) when there is no confusion.
We are going to prove that J1 ≥ 1 and that M1, ˜M ∈ [L1, L2] for some L1, L2 > 0 independent of c and
K appearing in the truncation functions. We denote
λ(2) = (2A + |C|2 + B′Γ(R + M+c D′D)−1(B + D′C))
−(B + D′C)′(R + M+c D′D)−1(M+c ∧ K)(B + D′C)
−B′(N+c ∧ K)(R + M+c D′D)−1(B + D′C). (4.62)
Then λ(2) is bounded, and M1 satisfies
˙M1 + λ(2)M1 + Q1 = 0, M1,T = G1. (4.63)
Hence M1 > 0. Similarly, we have ˜M > 0.
The equation for ˜M is 
− ˙˜M = ( Q1M1∨c ˜M −
Q2
M1∨c ( ˜M ∧ K) ˜M,
˜MT = G1G2 ;
(4.64)
hence ˜M admits an upper bound L2 independent of c and K. Choosing K = L2 and examining again (4.64),
we deduce that there exists L1 > 0 independent of c and K such that ˜M ≥ L1. Indeed, we can choose
L1 = min0≤t≤T Q1,tQ2,t ∧
G1
G2 and L2 = max0≤t≤T
Q1,t
Q2,t ∨
G1
G2 . As a result, choosing c < L1, the terms M
+
c can be
replaced by M = diag(M1Il, M1
˜M Il), respectively, in (4.60) without changing their values.
Now we prove J ≥ 1. Denote ˜J = J1 − 1, then ˜J satisfies the ODE:
˙
˜J = −λ(1) ˜J − [λ(1) +C′D(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)diag(Il, h2h1
˜MIl)B] = −λ(1) ˜J − a(1), (4.65)
where
a(1) = λ(1) +C′D(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)diag(Il, h2h1
˜MIl)B
= |C|2 − (λ + 1)C′D(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)D′C +C′DΓ(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)D′C + + Q1
M1 ∨ c
+C′D(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)diag(Il, h2h1
˜MIl)D′C
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≥ |C|2 − (λ + 1)C′D(R + MD′D)−1MD′C +C′DΓ(R + MD′D)−1(M ∧ K)D′C + + Q1
M1 ∨ c
= tr
{
(R + MD′D)−1 |C|
2 + Q1/(M1 ∨ c)
2l (R + MD
′D)
}
− (λ + 1)tr{(R + MD′D)−1D′CC′DM}
= tr
{
(R + MD′D)−1H
}
(4.66)
with H = |C|
2+Q1/(M1∨c)
2l (R + D′DM) − (λ + 1)D′CC′DM.
When c is small enough such that R − cD′D  0, we have
Q1
M1 ∨ c
(R + MD′D) ≥ Q1
L2
D′D. (4.67)
Hence,
H  ( |C|
2
2l D
′D − (λ + 1)D′CC′D)M  0, (4.68)
and consequently a(1) ≥ tr{(R + MD′D)−1H} ≥ 0. We then deduce that ˜J ≥ 0, and hence J1 ≥ 1. The
boundness of M1 can be proved by a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in [13].
Similarly, for the singular case R ≡ 0, we have
Theorem 4.4 Given G1 ≥ h1 ≥ 1,R ≡ 0, if B = λD′C and |C|2 − (λ + 1)C′D(D′D)−1D′C ≥ 0, then (4.55)
and (4.54) admit a unique positive solution.
Concluding the above two theorems, we can present our main results of this section:
Theorem 4.5 Given G1 ≥ h1 ≥ 1 and B = λD′C. The (4.54) admits a unique positive solution (M1, M2, N1)
in the following two cases:
(i) R − δI  0 for some δ > 0, |C|22l D′D − (λ + 1)D′CC′D  0;
(ii) R ≡ 0, |C|2 − (λ + 1)C′D(D′D)−1D′C ≥ 0.
Proof. Define pi(s; t) and ki(s; t) by (4.32) and (4.34), respectively. It is straightforward to check that
(u∗1, u∗2, X∗, p1, p2, k1, k2) satisfies the system of SDEs (3.31). Moreover, in the both cases, we can check that
αi,s and βi,s in (4.36) are all uniformly bounded, and hence u∗i ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rl) and X∗ ∈ L2(Ω; C(0, T ;R)).
Finally, denote Λi(s; t) = Ri,su∗i,s + pi(s; t)Bi,s + (Di,s)′ki(s; t), i = 1, 2. Plugging pi, ki, u∗i define in
(4.32),(4.34) and (4.36) into Λi, we have
Λi(s; t) = Ri,su∗i,s+ (Mi,sX∗s −Ni,sEt[X∗s ]−Γi,sX∗t +Φi,s)Bi,s+Mi,sD′i,s[CsX∗s +D1,su∗1,s+D2,su∗2,s+σs] (4.69)
and hence,
Λ(t; t) ,
(
Λ1(t; t)
Λ2(t; t)
)
= (Rt + MtD′t Dt)u∗t + Mt(Bt + D′tCt)X∗t − NtBtEt[X∗t ] − ΓtBtX∗t + (ΦtBt + MtD′tσt)
= −[(Mt − Nt − Γt)Bt + MtD′tCt]X∗t − (ΦtBt + MtD′tσt)
+Mt(Bt + D′tCt)X∗t − NtBtX∗t − ΓtBtX∗t + (ΦtBt + MtD′tσt)
= 0. (4.70)
Therefore, Λi satisfies the seond condition in (3.25).
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